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The present article questions the construction of ‘the contemporary’ in digital 
cultural heritage archives as specific strategic articulations between past and 
present with regard to the future. A historical exploration of the discourse of 
cultural heritage presents three strategic axes supposedly executed by the 
archive. Via a fourfold problematisation of the notion of the contemporary 
these axes are further developed with regard to W.J.T. Mitchell and Georges 
Didi-Huberman’s respective readings of Warburg’s Atlas Mnemosyne and 
Malraux’s Musée imaginaire. The article finally questions the possibility of 
ascribing inherent epistemological, existential, empirical and geopolitical 
force to a given technological archival order.
issue 24 : Images and Assemblages 2015
The digital cultural heritage archive appeared in the discourse of cultural heritage around 
the beginning of the new millennium and did so with certain specific goals—the digital 
preservation of and accessibility to cultural heritage should serve global tolerance, 
strengthen regional and national identity and, finally, inspire entrepreneurial creativity and 
innovation. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), 
the predominant global agent of cultural heritage since the Second World War, has tended 
to express the potential use-value of cultural heritage by appropriating a quote from Arjun 
Appadurai: ‘Culture is the resource that society needs to move from today to tomorrow’ 
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(UNESCO, 2010: 7). According to this discursive formation, operated internationally by 
UNESCO in parallel with its supranational and national counterparts, digital cultural 
heritage has a specific strategic temporality—the digital construction of the past as a force 
driving the present into the future. 
This article examines the specific strategic temporality of digital cultural heritage archives. 
It briefly discusses both the long history and more recent digital development of cultural 
heritage archives, particularly via UNESCO’s discursive framing of digital cultural heritage. 
It then questions the possibility of ascribing epistemological, existential, empirical and 
geopolitical force to a specific technological construction of the contemporary. It thus 
questions both the archival organisation of heterochronous objects in digital cultural 
heritage archives, and the shared temporality of communal formations that may congregate 
around them, that is, the possibility of collectively being in and for the same time.
To develop this line of questioning, the article takes as its theoretical point of departure 
Peter Osborne’s (2013) fourfold (UNESCO, 2010: 7) problematisation of the concept of 
the contemporary: 1. The epistemological problem of the contemporary as Kantian idea, 
that is, as heuristic fiction without any actual object; 2. The existential problem of the 
necessarily anticipatory structure of fragmented time; 3. The empirical problem of the 
speculative fiction of the contemporary as both a disavowal of politics and a productive act 
of imagination; and, 4. The geopolitical problem of the contemporary as the only possible 
articulation of the regional or national discourse in a theoretically coherent whole of 
history.
This problematisation of the contemporary is developed through a study of two 
paradigmatic archival forms that are often claimed as forerunners of the digital archive: Aby 
Warburg’s Atlas Mnemosyne (1924–1929) and André Malraux’s Musée imaginaire (1947–
1965). Through an engagement with two different readings of these archives, those of 
W.J.T. Mitchell and Georges Didi-Huberman, the examination of Warburg and Malraux then 
finally leads to the questioning of the present possibility of experiencing a heterochronous 
past of a coming community of memory via the digital cultural heritage archive.
The presence of the past
Political initiatives and strategies for the technological preservation of national, 
supranational and international cultural heritage did not, of course, originate with the 
advent of the digital. The preservation of specific monuments has been a priority for 
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millennia, although the scope of the preservation effort has varied greatly through 
the ages. According to The Modern Cult of Monuments (1903), a classic description of 
preservation strategies by Austrian art historian Alois Riegl (1858–1905), antiquity and 
the Middle Ages acknowledged only ‘intentional monuments’, that is, ‘those works which 
recall a specific moment or complex of moments from the past’ (Riegl, 1982: 24). Within 
this framework, should the historical occasion of a given monument fade in importance or 
‘commemorative value’ for its preservers, the monument’s protection would cease and its 
materials simply be repurposed for other endeavours.
Around the Italian Renaissance, antiquity’s appreciation of intentional monuments was 
joined by certain ‘unintentional monuments’ that obtained either an artistic or a historical 
value which transcended the specific identifications of ‘those for whom they had been 
erected and those who had an interest in preserving them […]’ (Riegl, 1982: 26). The 
difference between the intentional and unintentional monument is, as the names suggest, 
that the commemorative value of the first is attributed to the monument by its makers, 
whereas the latter gains its value from the recipients of the monument if they recognise in 
it elements of historical or aesthetic value. 
We can then, although somewhat reductively, distinguish three main Riegelian periods in 
our attitude towards monuments. Antiquity and the Middle Ages were primarily interested 
in the monuments explicitly meant for their attention and commemoration. This meant 
claiming a sort of immortality of the past, its unceasing monumental persistence in the 
prolonging of the present. Next, Renaissance Italy generated an interest in non-intentional 
monuments but still favoured monuments with an affiliation to related cultures of antiquity 
as the recovered source of their true identity. This meant including the achievements of 
earlier generations in a ‘notion of development’ from past artefacts to a future destiny 
which amounted to assuming ‘the heritage of related cultures of antiquity’ (Riegl, 1982: 
28). This attitude, prevalent until the eighteenth century, acknowledged the passing of 
time but, nonetheless, attempted to suspend it by granting the past ‘a present-day value 
[Gegenwartswert] for modern life and work’ (Riegl, 1982: 26).
Finally, it is not until the nineteenth century and the new prominence of cultural history 
that an interest in the tiniest minutiae of the ‘developmental chain’ of history is established 
leading to ‘[…] the modern shape we know today […]: an interest inclusive of the smallest 
deeds and events of even the most remote peoples, who, despite insurmountable 
differences in character, allow us to recognize ourselves in each and every one of them’ 
(Riegl, 1982: 26). In addition to this enlarged scope that allows humanity to encounter 
itself where e’er it may venture, this attitude is also characterised, especially in its early 
twentieth century incarnation, by the appreciation of ‘age-value’, that is, the visible signs of 
time’s passing in the decay of monuments.
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From the point of view of preservation, this age-value was at odds with the goal of 
historical value to preserve the monument in its given state of decay–neither allowing 
complete restoration (newness-value) or further decay (age-value). But already for Riegl, 
developments within the technical means of reproduction and, furthermore, dissemination 
of artefacts were seen as a way to ease the tension between opposing values: 
[…] the development of modern techniques of reproduction promises that in 
the near future (especially since the invention of color photography and fac-
simile reproduction) new and perfect means of compensating for the originals 
will be found (Riegl, 1982: 37–38).
Building blocks of the future
Since its early beginnings in the late 1940s, UNESCO shared Riegl’s interest in the capacity 
of the latest technologies to both preserve that which could be lost and disseminate that 
which was not easily accessible: 
The Department of Cultural Activities also tries to recommend and promote 
the use of the most modern methods in the pursuit of its permanent aims–the 
preservation and enhancement of the cultural heritage of mankind, and the 
dissemination of culture (UNESCO, 1952: 378–379). 
At this time, UNESCO’s ‘modern methods’ comprised the preservation of art and music 
reproductions on film, microfilm and records and dissemination was done via television, 
radio and ‘special vans’ bringing reproductions and books to remote locations (UNESCO, 
1952: 379). The goal was to enlist the ‘help of modern technology […] to encourage a 
taste for, and knowledge of, the arts […] to raise the average cultural level and to promote 
international artistic exchanges […] with the object of improving the standard of living of 
contemporary man’ (UNESCO, 1952: 379). Although the term is here used unemphatically, 
the aim of constructing the contemporary via technological preservation and dissemination 
of cultural artefacts should be noted.
The promotion of education via modern technology slowly entered the digital domain in the 
late 1980s and 1990s where the use of ICT (Information and Communication Technology) 
figures prominently in many UNESCO documents recognising: 
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[…] the important role that the new information and communication technolo-
gies, and particularly informatics, can play in extending educational services 
to new sections of the population, and in improving the quality and efficacy of 
the educational process (UNESCO, 1987: 40).
This introduction of information and communication technologies, ‘in particular those 
relating to informatics as a subject taught’, also aimed at ‘distance education’ (UNESCO, 
1987, 43), thus continuing by digital means the earlier efforts of disseminating culture.
UNESCO’s educational effort explicitly demonstrated the understanding of the past as 
an untapped potential for driving the present into the future, when, in 1993, UNESCO 
established a World Commission on Culture and Development, claiming that ‘Genuine 
development can only be built on the basis of culture, which is its source, its mainspring 
and its ultimate goal. Ready-made imported development models have collapsed, because 
they have neglected the circumstances specific to each society, and the untapped potential 
of cultures’ (UNESCO, 1993: 1). In spite of a certain metaphorical confusion, culture is 
clearly presented as: firstly, a source or potential; secondly, the driving mechanical force of 
development, and finally, the goal of this development.
The reason for this final emphasis, on culture as goal, is further illustrated in 1996: ‘[…] 
culture shapes all our thinking, imagining and behaviour’ (UNESCO, 1996: 12). The idea 
was to implement ‘culture’ in ‘development strategies’ as ‘a central variable […] if not the 
essence itself, of sustainable development, since attitudes and life-styles govern the ways 
we manage all our non-renewable resources’ (UNESCO, 1996: 10). Culture is thus crucial 
to ‘humankind’s creative capacities in the face of a treasured past and an unpredictable 
future’ (UNESCO, 1996: 10). 
Whereas Riegl presented different commemoration values and strategies of preservation 
and wondered how to solve their inherent tensions, UNESCO focuses on the use-value 
of ‘a treasured past’ in ‘the educational process’ (UNESCO, 1987: 40) to further ‘human 
development’ and ‘human betterment’ (UNESCO, 1996: 7). For Riegl, use-value–a 
subcategory of present-day value–is expressed, for example, in the inhabitability of 
a house which, if inhabitable, must not be left to decay (age-value). For UNESCO, the 
use-value of heritage is a way of encountering an ‘unpredictable future’. There are no 
tensions between conflicting commemoration or preservation values, only the ‘untapped 
potential of cultures’. This is the ideological framework into which the term ‘digital heritage’ 
was inscribed when, in 2001, it first found its firm place within major UNESCO documents 
such as the Medium-Term Strategy and the General Conference Resolutions. 
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The movement from analogue to digital modes of use-value is evident in the move from 
1952’s educational couple of ‘preservation’ and ‘dissemination’ to the frequent coupling by 
2001 of ‘preservation’ with ‘access’. UNESCO becomes concerned with ‘preservation and 
continuing accessibility’ or ‘preservation of and permanent access to digitally produced 
materials’ (UNESCO, 2001: 71). According to UNESCO, the digital past should have a 
‘permanent’ present-day use-value: ‘The purpose of preserving the digital heritage is to 
ensure that it remains accessible to the public’ (UNESCO, 2004: 75). And finally, the ‘digital 
information life cycle’ is described as going ‘from creation to access’ (UNESCO, 2004: 75). 
Access is presented here as the telos of creation.
UNESCO’s focus on access reorders Riegl’s perception of use-value and age-value. 
For Riegl believed that use-value would usually triumph over age-value as it makes no 
sense to leave a perfectly useful house to decay. However, if use-value was diminished 
enough, then age-value could reign free: ‘Only works for which we have no use can be 
enjoyed exclusively from the standpoint of age-value, while those which are still useful 
impede such pure contemplation’ (Riegl, 1982: 42). For UNESCO, however, age-value and 
historical value’s concern for ‘authenticity’ and ‘an authentic record’ serve the purpose 
of optimising use-value in the form of ‘potential of the heritage’ as ‘the building blocks of 
the future’ (UNESCO, 2004: 75–76). The focus of the digital cultural heritage archive is on 
the preserved past as the building blocks of the future that need to be assembled in the 
present via unfettered access.
Three strategic axes of digital cultural heritage
The goal of preserving the past in order to make it accessible in the present as building 
blocks of the future manifests itself in the general interest in digital cultural heritage 
archives from 2001 onwards across UNESCO, the EU and nation states. This strategic 
temporal construction seems to fall along three axes:
⁃ Global tolerance by facilitating knowledge of the other;  
⁃ Regional and national identity through the knowledge of the self;  
⁃ Entrepreneurial creativity and innovation through the knowledge and possible         
exploitation of the abundant cultural resources inherited from our common forebears.
Admittedly, these axes are not new but in the shift from dissemination to access their 
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scope has changed. For example, ‘special vans’ are no longer needed to transport 
reproductions to remote locations. In fact, both temporal and spatial remoteness seem to 
have been vanquished altogether: 
The digital heritage is inherently unlimited by time, geography, culture or for-
mat. […] The digital heritage of all regions, countries and communities should 
be preserved and made accessible, so as to assure over time representation of 
all peoples, nations, cultures and languages (UNESCO, 2004: 75).
This goal of global representation and the beneficial consequences for our relation to 
the other, are not unique to UNESCO. They are are further expressed as part of a general 
discourse of cultural heritage, for example in the plans for the European Union’s digital 
library Europeana, which acts as an Internet portal to a wide selection of European cultural 
institutions’ digital collections: ‘Improved access to our cultural heritage will create “unity in 
diversity”’ (Europeana, 2013: 5). 
Not surprisingly, the second axis takes ‘identity’ as its watchword and is more prominent in 
supranational or national contexts, since global identity would coincide with the question of 
‘unity in diversity’: 
‘[…] through the meeting, exchanging and sharing that culture entails, [a Euro-
pean digital library] can help to bring the European Union into closer contact 
with its citizens and a true European identity to take root and find expression’ 
(European Parliament, 2007: 3). 
Access to culture as the root of identity is also found on a national level. A report on the 
state of digitised cultural heritage in Denmark, for instance, clearly claims: 
‘Cultural heritage is of significant importance for the Danish sense of identity 
in a globalised world, and in these years, the importance of art and culture will 
increase. The government will therefore continue the work with communicating 
Danish cultural heritage, nationally and internationally’ (Digitaliseringsudvalget, 
2009: 3). [1]
We have already seen the third axis in UNESCO’s 1996 call for a closer coupling of ‘culture’ 
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and ‘development’. It finds a more recent expression in a current UNESCO theme, 
‘Protecting Our Heritage and Fostering Creativity’ (UNESCO, 2014), which in November 
2013 fostered UNESCO’s fifth most popular tweet of the month: ‘Put culture & creativity at 
the heart of sustainable development & public policy! #supportcreativity pic.twitter.com/
dcdCr1zk1B’ (UNESCO, 2013). Preservation and access–also referred to as ‘safeguarding’ 
and ’sharing’–are aimed at supporting ‘creativity, innovation and the emergence of dynamic 
cultural sectors’ (UNESCO, 2014). And furthermore: ‘Both heritage and creativity lay the 
foundations for vibrant, innovative and prosperous knowledge societies’ (UNESCO, 2014). 
These three axes also form the three main aims of the EU Horizon 2020 Work Programme 
for 2014–2015, although in a different order: 
The first aim is […] to analyse and develop social, economic and political inclu-
sion and positive inter-cultural dynamics in the EU. […] The second aim is to 
foster the development of innovative societies and policies in Europe through 
the engagement of citizens, civil society organisations, enterprises and us-
ers in research and innovation […] The third aim is to contribute to an under-
standing […] of its cultural heritage and of its identities in order to strengthen 
cohesion and solidarity and to encourage modern visions and uses of its past 
(European Commission, 2014: 5).
The formulation of each aim ends with the proclamation of its ability to support a general 
notion of innovation as bringer of economic growth. For example, the third aim of identity 
concludes: 
‘In these efforts, new technologies and digital cultural heritage should play an 
important innovative role as they enable new and richer interpretations of our 
common European culture while contributing to sustainable economic growth’ 
(European Commission, 2014: 5).
The three aims of EU Horizon 2020 are formulated in the context of the current financial 
crisis. As has hopefully been demonstrated, though, these aims do not appear within the 
discourse of cultural heritage as a result of the crisis. They are but the culmination of a long 
development of a cultural heritage discourse with what is now a technologically enabled 
global scope. As mentioned previously, this scope is summed up nicely by Director-General 
of UNESCO Irina Bokova’s quote from Arjun Appadurai–a quote also used on numerous 
other occasions by UNESCO, including on Twitter: ‘Culture is the resource that society 
needs to move from today to tomorrow’ (UNESCO, 2010: 7).
fibreculturejournal.org       FCJ-174          41 
Torsten Andreasen
The idea of contemporaneity
Within the discourse of cultural heritage the contemporary is presented as a relatively 
uncomplicated gateway between past and future. Yet such uninhibited access is only 
possible via the strategic construction of the specific interactions between past, present 
and future. In order to question this construction, it is useful here to begin with the 
problematisation of the concept of the contemporary by Peter Osborne. Although his (2013) 
investigation of the concept of the contemporary aims to make the distinction between 
contemporary and modern art, his fourfold problematisation holds for our purpose as well.
The contemporary, Osborne argues, is an ‘idea’ in the Kantian sense, that is, ‘its object 
(the total conjunction of present times) is beyond possible experience […] and is hence a 
problem that requires investigation’ (Osborne, 2013: 22). The idea as the representational 
form of reason, is thus distinct from Kant’s two other representational forms: intuition as 
the immediate representation of an experiential object through sensibility and the concept 
as the representation of an experiential object mediated by other representations through 
understanding (Deleuze, 1984: 8). Such ideas are ‘heuristic fictions’ that may ‘“regulate” 
experience as long as they are not contradicted by it’ (Osborne, 2013: 22).
Apart from UNESCO’s 1952 evocation of ‘contemporary man’, the term ‘the contemporary’ 
is not widely and certainly not emphatically used in the above-mentioned sources. The 
‘total conjunction of present times’ is, however, distinctly operational in the specific 
ordering of the cultural past as ‘untapped potential’ in order to drive the present into the 
future. And not only do the presented sources claim a contemporaneity of global presents, 
they also claim a contemporaneity of global pasts: ‘The digital heritage is inherently 
unlimited by time, geography, culture or format’ (UNESCO, 2004: 75).
The specific temporal conjunction into which our three strategic axes are deployed 
constitutes the operational field of cultural heritage agents. The permanent present-day 
use-value of the past as the heuristic fiction of the unlimited contemporaneity of past and 
present is what allows for the constitution of cultural heritage as untapped potential. 
What Riegl described as the recognition of ourselves in ‘the smallest deeds and events of 
even the most remote peoples’ (Riegl, 1982: 26) has now presumably been technologically 
relieved of remoteness. The recognition of ourselves and others via the heritage of deeds 
and events is open for creative innovation–a development which, we will remember, entails 
the shaping of ‘our thinking, imagining and behaviour’ as well as the management of ‘all 
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our non-renewable resources’. The operations of the contemporary as unlimited temporal 
conjunction are thus a necessary presupposition for the strategic goals of the guardians 
of cultural heritage. The specific construction of the contemporary as idea establishes the 
terrain for these strategic operations.
Existential time or standing reserve
The temporal conjunction of cultural heritage is, of course, an idea or fiction contradicted 
by experience in several ways, and is as such an epistemological ‘problem that 
requires investigation’. Heidegger delivered one such investigation via an existential 
problematisation in which he argued that the present itself ‘in its presentness, cannot be 
considered some kind of self-contained temporal receptacle for objects of experience, 
since it only exists as the differentiation or fractured togetherness of the other two 
temporal modes (past and future), under the priority of its futural dimension’ (Osborne, 
2013: 23). A common and false conception of time as a receptacle containing a past, 
present and future is only derivative of a more profound temporality (Heidegger, 2001: 
374) which has as the ‘ontological condition for its possibility, the state of Being of care’ 
(Heidegger, 2001: 437). Care is here characteristic of Dasein which, in its thrownness, ‘is 
essentially futural […][O]nly an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of 
having-been, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its 
own thrownness and be in the moment of vision for “its time”’ (Heidegger, 2001: 437).
This Heideggerian heritage is not a past as resource. For Heidegger, time is the ‘unity of a 
future which makes present in the process of having been’ (Heidegger, 2001: 374) and not 
the ordinary understanding of ‘the world-historical [as] something present-at-hand which 
comes along, has presence, and then disappears’ (Heidegger, 2001: 437). Nor is time in any 
way unlimited in this passing, it is directed towards its own end in death. Being ‘for one’s 
time’ is a reckoning of time. It is an articulation and constitution of time itself, a specific 
singular temporality, and not the inscription of the self in the linear passing of time or in the 
eternal present of past time.
From this perspective, the very specific strategic construction or implementation of the 
past in the present as a driving force with regard to the future must be described as 
the ordering of culture in terms of the later Heidegger’s concept of ‘standing reserve’ 
(Bestand). That is, the past in the present becomes a resource reduced to its ready 
availability with regards to a specific purpose: creativity and innovation as modes of 
actualising the ‘untapped potential of culture’ in the production of a specific future 
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(economic growth). This would also articulate certain reverberations between Riegl’s 
rendition of recognition of the self in the tiniest detail of cultural history and Heidegger’s 
critique of the technical attitude of ‘Enframing’ (Gestell) which orders a given entity 
as standing reserve. The human ordering of the entirety of being as standing reserve 
seemingly lets humanity meet only itself in the world: ‘In truth, however, precisely nowhere 
does man today any longer encounter himself, i.e., his essence’ (Heidegger, 1977: 27).
Empirical time or imaginative disavowal
Next, the temporal conjunction of an unlimited past in an unlimited present is contradicted 
by experience on empirical grounds: ‘There is no socially actual shared subject-position 
of, or within, our present from the standpoint of which its relational totality could be lived 
as a whole, in however epistemologically problematic or temporal-existentially fragmented 
anticipatory form’ (Osborne, 2013: 23). The temporal conjunction of global cultural heritage 
operates as if this totality were an actual empirical entity liveable both as a resource 
shared by a global community and an individually accessible potential affording personal 
edification and development. 
Such an entity is an operative fiction which amounts to a disavowal of politics in its 
postulation of a unity of time as standing reserve. It obliterates the possibility of any 
fundamental disagreement or dispute of history in favour of the tranquility of creative 
potential. On the other hand, it is also a ‘productive act of imagination’ positing this tranquil 
historical coexistence as a given. Or, in the specific case of global cultural heritage, the 
productive act of imagination of a ‘heritage inherently unlimited by time, geography, culture 
or format’ disavows all political disputes within that unlimited sphere in favour of the 
community of peacefully coexisting individuals engaged in creative and innovative pursuits. 
We must acknowledge that in our present context, the rapid succession of technological 
generations is itself the necessary mechanical foundation of the fictional eternity of 
heritage. [3] Executive Director of the Digital Public Library of America, Daniel J. Cohen, 
states that far from the fetish of unfettered access to the eternally preserved artefact, the 
digital object requires ‘a special set of eyes, often unique hardware, and an accompanying 
operating system and application software, to view or read them properly’ (Cohen 2005, 
15). As Wendy Hui Kyong Chun has argued, far from fulfilling ‘the archival promise’ of a 
calculable ‘future simple’ the digital format is but an ‘enduring ephemeral’ (Chun, 2008: 
148–150).
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Geopolitical time and the task of the archive
In the very construction of its temporality, the supposedly limitless digital heritage archive 
projects an imaginary global present and therefore actively disavows any possible dispute, 
disagreement or strife. Yet there are many potentially antagonistic relations within this 
projected unity. For example, different postcolonial temporalities involve ‘not just temporal, 
but equally, indeed, in certain respects primarily–spatial’ antagonisms (Osborne, 2013: 25). 
This, of course, poses a geopolitical problem, and consequently, it poses a task. Such a 
task demands that the imaginary act of the contemporary be other than the constitution 
of a coherent whole of history, whether national, supranational or international. In this 
regard, Osborne explicitly references the young Nietzsche’s notion of the ‘untimely’ 
(unzeitgemmäße): 
‘That much, however, I must concede to myself on account of my profession 
as a classicist: for I do not know what meaning classical studies could have 
for our time if they were not untimely–that is to say, acting counter to our time 
and thereby acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a time to 
come’ (Nietzsche, 1997: 60). 
For Nietzsche, history serves not a consolidation of time, but a challenging of the present 
in order to open up the future. 
This was also Deleuze’s point when, still referencing Nietzsche, he located the untimely 
(intempestif / actuel) as the other side of Foucault’s archaeology: the diagnostics that 
brought archaeological analysis of what we have ceased to be into an emancipatory 
relation to our own becoming (Deleuze, 1992: 164). [4] This was also, finally, the crux of 
Agamben’s argument when he discussed Barthes’ explicit bringing of the Nietzschean 
notion of the ‘untimely’ into relation with the ‘contemporary’ (‘il contemporaneo’) 
(Agamben, 2009a: 40). For Agamben, to be contemporary is never to belong to or coincide 
with one’s time. Rather, the opening of time in con-temporaneity as being ‘for one’s 
time’ and not just engulfed in it, necessarily entails a challenging of the projection of a 
community of peacefully coexisting individuals engaged in creative and innovative pursuits.
Grid vs. Vortex
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So far, we have examined and problematised one of the main recent discourses of cultural 
heritage that has rendered possible and in many cases framed the funding of digital 
cultural heritage archives. The problematisation of ‘the contemporary’ has demonstrated 
that the idea of the contemporary is the presupposition that allows for the constitution of 
cultural heritage as the terrain of untapped potential for the three strategic axes of cultural 
heritage discourse. Yet we have seen that this potential rests on a specific temporality 
of standing reserve which ignores the possibility of a more fundamental existential 
temporality claimed by the earlier Heidegger. From an empirical perspective, it has then 
been suggested that the cultural heritage discourse projects a contemporary conjunction 
of temporalities beyond any liveable subject position and that it thereby entails the 
negation of any political disagreement or dispute with regards to the past. Finally, I have 
begun to suggest that this disavowal of politics poses a geopolitical task which–according 
to the tradition running from Nietzsche via Deleuze to Agamben–must challenge the 
unified contemporaneity of cultural heritage and instead consider contemporaneity as 
being out of time and ‘for time’ in order to bring about a time to come.
The digital cultural heritage archive is thus positioned within a battlefield of temporalities. 
The battle sees a a singular temporality challenge the archive’s supposed universal 
contemporaneity of presents and pasts, the temporal conjunction of heterochronous 
objects and the global conjunction of collectivities. In order to understand the privileged 
role of the digital archive within this battlefield, we must now consider the temporal 
constructions of more specific archival orders. Or rather, staying within discourse analysis, 
we should consider the discursive attribution of potential to certain archival configurations. 
If the digital cultural heritage archive holds a specific threefold promise as articulated 
along the strategic axes depicted above, how does the digital archival order honour that 
promise?
Aby Warburg’s Atlas Mnemosyne and André Malraux’s Musée imaginaire have both been 
referenced as paradigmatic archival forms of great promise ultimately fulfilled by their 
digital successors. [5] They supposedly held specific potentials for knowledge creation and 
a sense of human collectivity. W.J.T. Mitchell’s and Georges Didi-Huberman’s respective 
analyses of specific arrays, albums and atlases have both attempted to distill the respective 
characteristics of these two exemplars. 
In a recent lecture entitled Madness and Montage - Symptom and Symbol from Aby 
Warburg to A Beautiful Mind (Mitchell, 2014b), Mitchell deploys a spatial dialectics 
between grid and vortex as a way of describing image arrays: grid representing rational 
Cartesian space and vortex as an expression of transformation, vertigo and madness. [6] 
Mitchell is less interested in the attempts to transform multiple images into ‘unified artistic 
compositions’, for example in Gerhard Richter’s Atlas (1964–1995) and Robert Morris’ 
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Untitled (Scatter Piece) (1968–1969), that could in themselves hint at, respectively, the 
grid and the vortex. Rather, Mitchell wants to examine the ‘provisional assemblage’, the 
operations behind the production of ‘image knowledge’. 
Mitchell highlights two notable exceptions to the ‘normal practice in art history’ in which 
the display of image arrays is controlled in relation to a predetermined discourse or 
interpretation. Warburg’s Atlas Mnemosyne and Malraux’s Musée imaginaire instead 
acknowledge the provisional character of the assemblage. One common characteristic of 
these two arrays or assemblages, which renders them especially relevant to the present 
context, is that—similar to Riegl’s tentative technological solution to the tension between 
historical value and age value and UNESCO’s increased use of ‘the most modern methods’ 
in their pursuit of ‘preservation and dissemination’ and, later, ’preservation and access’—
they both consist of photographic reproductions. 
Although the distinction was never explicit, one got the impression that, according to 
Mitchell, Warburg tended towards the vortex while Malraux tended toward the grid. 
Maurice Jarnoux’s famous depictions of the latter in his home (André Malraux chez lui, 
1953) shows the floor covered by a nice grid of reproductions for his Musée imaginaire, a 
grid brought to only the slightest degree of turbulence around the feet of the organising 
mastermind. On the other hand, although Warburg’s plates do have a certain grid-like 
distribution, Mitchell quoted Didi-Huberman’s comments that Warburg’s goal was to set art 
history in motion: 
To create a knowledge-montage was […] to reject the matrices of intelligibility, 
to break through the age-old guardrails. This movement, with its new “allure” 
of knowledge, created the possibility of vertigo. […] The image is not a closed 
field of knowledge; it is a whirling, centrifugal field. It is not a field of knowl-
edge like any other […] (Mitchell, 2014b) [7]. 
Mitchell ended his lecture by showing the art installation T_Visionarium developed 
by iCinema which ‘offers the means to capture and re-present televisual information, 
allowing viewers to explore and actively edit a multitude of stories in three dimensions’ 
(T_Visionarium, 2008). The digital installation demonstrated how the current enormous 
capacity for capturing, storing, displaying and manipulating data can move from grid to 
vortex in an instant. As Mitchell concluded: ‘If we are to study the totality of the world’s 
images, we had better get used to vertigo’ (Mitchell, 2014a).
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Album vs. Atlas
Mitchell proposes to analyse image arrays as a dialectic between grid and vertigo, 
between synchronous order and productive madness, one based on simultaneity, the other 
on futurity. Any image array will interface between the two; with Malraux a bit more on 
the side of the grid and Warburg more on the side of the vortex. Similarly, Didi-Huberman 
spends the better part of a recent book, L’Album de L’art à l’époque du « Musée imaginaire 
» (2013), presenting a fundamental conflict between Malraux’s Album and Warburg’s Atlas 
as two opposing ways of approaching pictorial heritage. 
Didi-Huberman perceives Warburg’s Atlas–with its arrays of heterogeneous reproductions 
indistinctly related to a given theme or Pathosformel–as a fundamental complexity which 
can never be resolved into a unifying concept, a complete archive or a strict classification 
(Didi-Huberman, 2011: 20). This observation is based on the claim that images; 
[…] if organised in a specific way offered us the possibility–or, rather, the un-
depletable resource–for a rereading of the world. […][The Bilderatlas] offered 
[…] an apparatus for setting thought back in motion, exactly where history 
had stopped or where words were still lacking. It was the matrix of a desire 
to reconfigure memory by refusing the fixation of memories–the images of 
the past–in an ordered, or worse, definitive, narration (Didi-Huberman, 2011: 
20–21). 
This imaginative perpetuum mobile is ‘thus our heritage, the heritage of our time’ 
(Didi-Huberman, 2011: 21); a heritage which is both aesthetic and epistemic in that the new 
aesthetic forms entail a new approach to knowledge. 
For Didi-Huberman as for Mitchell, Warburg presents an articulation between grid and 
vortex, between ‘raison et déraison’ (Didi-Huberman, 2011: 22). Didi-Huberman is, however, 
explicitly critical of Malraux and his Album for snapping the images too firmly to the grid; 
for losing sight of the ‘mad’ end of Mitchell’s spectrum. [8] Although Malraux claimed 
that, contrary to the affirmation of the traditional museum, his Musée imaginaire was an 
interrogation (Malraux, 1999: 176), Didi-Huberman accuses Malraux of instantly answering 
his own questions (Didi-Huberman, 2013: 31). If Malraux claims his Album to be what 
Mitchell called a ‘provisional assemblage’, Didi-Huberman claims that this provisionality is 
directed solely towards a ‘unified cultural composition’. In spite of the intended dialogue 
between reproductions of artefacts from the remotest as well as the most familiar cultures, 
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this dialogue was never allowed to go astray, dissolve into nonsense or get stuck in 
irresolvable tension or conflict. It was always brought back to ‘a stylistic or spiritual 
synthesis which grounds its notion of universal “art” or “creation”’ (Didi-Huberman, 2013: 
41).
The Musée imaginaire is the authoritative accumulation and presentation of timeless 
genius. It is open insofar as new or unknown old works of genius can be added, but 
closed with regard to a historical challenge of universal human essence. It is thus a 
re-sacralisation—the reproduced work is included in the church of universality. And 
this re-sacralisation is quite literal, insofar as many of the works included in the Musée 
imaginaire are often former religious sculptures wrenched form their erstwhile cultic 
context and re-inscribed into the cult of universal cultural heritage. [9]
Where Walter Benjamin would have argued for the technologically induced 
decontextualisation of the reproduced work of art as potential emancipation from tradition 
in the passage from cult-value to exhibition-value (Benjamin, 1968a), Malraux re-inscribes 
the object in the universal eternity of the Album form of his Musée. For Malraux, the 
emancipation of mechanical reproduction is what allows the possible decontextualisation 
and subsequent inclusion in universality: ‘In this way reproduction frees a style from 
the limitations which made it appear to be a minor art’ (Malraux, 1974: 22). Mechanical 
reproduction salvages the artefact from its contextual limitations in order to include it in the 
family album: ‘[…] photography imparts a family likeness to objects that have actually but 
slight affinity’ (Malraux, 1974: 21). 
Malraux’s praise of the present presence of the accumulated past in the universal eternity 
of cultural heritage can be gleaned in crystalline form from a speech he gave to Gaullist 
intellectuals in Paris on March 5, 1948: ‘And in this hall tonight, we can say without ridicule: 
“You who are here, you are the first generation to inherit all of earth”’ (Malraux, 1989: 273). 
[10] All of earth can be included in the family album and we can all be the first descendants 
of that arche-generation.
Profanation
Didi-Huberman accuses Malraux of re-sacralising the decontextualised artefact and praises 
Warburg for his archival vertigo, ‘a movement demanding all the anthropological aspects 
of being and time’ (Didi-Huberman, 2004: 13). Maurice Blanchot captures re-sacralisation 
quite well in one of his essays on the Musée imaginaire: 
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[W]ho looks at Gothic statues? We do; the others invoked them. The conse-
quence of the disappearance of prayer was to make monuments and works of 
art appear, to make painting an art within reach of our eyes (Blanchot, 1997: 
15). 
We no longer invoke, we look, study and appreciate, and according to Malraux this 
gaze gives access to a universal essence of the human instead of a more Warburgian 
problematisation of time and being. The problematising temporal dynamism of Warburg’s 
project is clearly expressed in his description of the Pathosformeln as ‘disconnected 
dynamograms’, where images cut off from their original constellations of meaning 
‘reacquire their efficacy every time they encounter the artist (or the scholar)’ (Agamben, 
2009c: 57). 
As is not unexpected from an accusation of re-sacralisation, Didi-Huberman finds 
salvation in a gesture of profanation. At more or less the same time as Malraux was 
being photographed at home surrounded by photographic reproductions for his Musée 
imaginaire, Chris Marker and Alain Resnais presented a short film entitled Les Statues 
Meurent Aussi (1953). [11] In a style reminiscent of Malraux’s photographic reproductions, 
Marker and Resnais show various African artefacts, scenes from African and western 
culture and various western appropriations of African culture. 
When men die, they enter history. When statues die, they enter the realm of 
art. This botany of death is what we call culture. […] An object is dead when 
the living gaze which rested on it has disappeared. And when we have dis-
appeared, our objects go where we send those of the negrés : the museum 
(Marker, 1961: 11).
The museum is a sacralising mausoleum that wrenches the cult object from its origins and 
forces it into the history of art [12]: 
Classified, labeled, preserved in the glass showcases and in collections, they 
enter the history of art. Paradise of forms where the most mysterious kinships 
are established: we recognise Greece in a more than 2000 year old African 
head, Japan in a mask from the Ogooué, or India, the Sumerian idols, Roman 
figures of Christ or our modern art (Marker, 1961: 20). 
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The kinships of the museum unhindered by geographical or cultural distance supposedly 
allow for the identification of any individual with the universal human. In the specific 
temporal conjunction of past and present in the museum, humans recognise only 
themselves. 
The film stresses the problem that this universalising celebration of culture glosses over: 
the very real oppression, exploitation and estrangement behind the accumulation of 
artefacts. A black woman is shown in front of a shop window displaying African statues 
and shortly thereafter a white man is shown teaching a young black man how to make 
cheap reproductions of African art objects. In spite of the hopes of Benjamin, the loss of 
cult-value has not challenged the ruling class or private property. It has only reinforced 
white hegemony and black estrangement. 
The end of the film affirms the possibility of the black artist to say No! Whether in the 
boxing ring or on the concert stage, the black artist tries to literally strike back, to ‘give 
back the punches his brothers receive in the street’ (Marker, 1961: 24). The movie shows a 
black man with a camera aimed directly at the screen: 
He even dares to take a camera to create for himself the historicity of his 
struggles or the state of our own cultures, thus partaking in the mastering of 
reproducibility and the possibility of looking at us, in all the meanings of the 
word (Didi-Huberman, 2013: 166–167). 
Didi-Huberman clearly sees in the recapture of the means of mechanical reproduction a 
possibility for a challenging of the universal time of the Album, that is, a temporal dispute 
otherwise disavowed by the projection of universal time by the discourse of cultural 
heritage. [13]
Didi-Huberman thus presents the challenging of universal time in Les Statues meurent 
aussi as a mode of profanation akin to Warburg’s Atlas–the only resolution to a conflict 
which he describes by referencing Walter Benjamin. The conflict between universal 
and singular time is described by Benjamin’s distinction between a universal history 
whose ‘method is additive; it musters a mass of data to fill the homogeneous, empty 
time’ (Benjamin, 1968b: 262) and Benjamin’s materialistic historiography which locates ‘a 
configuration pregnant with tensions’ (Benjamin, 1968b: 262) enabling the constellation 
of a specific now with a specific past in an emancipatory break with the steady flow of 
progress (Didi-Huberman, 2013: 171).
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A coming community of memory
Both Warburg’s Atlas and Malraux’s Album have been seen as forerunners for 
contemporary digital archives and Mitchell correctly locates their unification in something 
like the T_Visionarium, the interface of which (large curved screens from floor to ceiling) 
can visually change display types from grid to vortex by the push of a button. For what 
is the digital archive but the zone of indistinction where grid and vortex coincide? Even 
beyond the interface, at a very material level, digital memory and storage, from the 
Williams Tube over spinning Hard Drives to current Solid State Drives, have always been 
characterised by a grid either flickering, fading or in rapid motion (Chun, 2008). 
The digital archive is, in its modes of preservation as in its modes of access, a grid in 
movement and it seems that this digital whirling of the grid inspires new archival hopes in 
both the powers of re-sacralisation and the emancipatory efforts of profanation. ‘We had 
better get used to vertigo’, Mitchell said. But when the digital grid’s vortical movement 
is the condition of possibility of the universal history of cultural heritage, can it then 
truly be said that ‘if organised in a specific way’ images or cultural artefacts still offer 
us ‘the possibility–or, rather, the undepletable resource–for a rereading of the world’ 
(Didi-Huberman, 2011: 20)? 
Is it indeed possible to attribute inherent aesthetic, epistemic or political characteristics 
to a specific organisation of cultural artefacts? And is the black artist’s ability to strike 
back by ‘partaking in the mastering of reproducibility’, to ‘create for himself the historicity 
of his struggles or the state of our own cultures’, not also a partaking in the reproduction 
of Malraux’s pose at home where the grid only whirls at the feet of the organising 
mastermind? Is not the T_Visionarium as the ‘means to capture and re-present televisual 
information, allowing viewers to explore and actively edit a multitude of stories in three 
dimensions’ exactly the present day culmination of Malraux’s re-sacralisation where any 
vertiginous rearrangement of the provisional assemblage is re-inscribed in the Album of the 
database? 
It is necessary here to insist again on the question of attributing inherent epistemological, 
existential, empirical and geopolitical force to a given technological archival order (grid/
vortex, album/atlas) and the consequent constructions of the contemporary as, respectively, 
universal and singular time. In a digital age, Warburg’s Atlas is not inherently a good 
a model for materialistic historiography. It can most certainly be considered a tool for 
such a historiography, a trace of its maker’s singular practice. Yet we should be wary of 
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generalising its historiographical qualities beyond that specific instance, especially as an 
adoptable mode of profanation. This will just snap the vortex back to the grid. 
Claiming a specific archival distribution as the presupposition for a specific construction of 
the contemporary must be abandoned as pure mimicry of the discourse of cultural heritage. 
We should remember that the latter desires nothing but the archive as the ‘undepletable 
resource for a rereading of the world’ which Didi-Huberman saw in Warburg’s Atlas. Indeed, 
in spite of his tendency to attribute inherent emancipatory powers to the Warburgian 
image array, Didi-Huberman does seem to acknowledge some of the problems involved. 
A crucial aspect of this is the need for a radical rejection of a claimed causality between 
archival distribution and construction of the contemporary. Didi-Huberman writes: ‘Since 
the Lumière brothers filmed their Sortie d’usine, it has become easy to film regular people. 
The whole question is knowing how’ (Didi-Huberman, 2012: 198). 
The question is not one of arrays or archival order nor of recapturing mechanical 
reproduction to master one’s own story. In the age of digital reproduction, that has become 
easy. The question is ‘knowing how’ to profane: ‘Profanation is the counter-apparatus that 
restores to common use what sacrifice had separated and divided’ (Agamben, 2009b: 
19). Profanation is neither the destruction of the sacralising apparatus of cultural heritage 
discourse nor is it the ‘correct’ use of its archive (Agamben, 2009b: 15). Rather, profanation 
brings the past out of its role as standing reserve or eternally present use-value. 
Profanation seeks to render the discourse of cultural heritage inoperable by freeing the 
past from its necessary re-inscription along the three strategic axes and to establish the 
possibility for new use which is not premised on a presupposed use-value. This can only 
be done via a problematisation of the unified temporal conjunction of the contemporary to 
which the discourse of cultural heritage contributes. 
In this respect, Mitchell establishes a dialectical spectrum, a zone whose articulations 
remain too indistinct. Didi-Huberman, on the other hand, sometimes loses his way in 
the zone of indistinction and sees profanation in vortexes already too close to the grid. 
The indistinction between presupposed use-value and the potential for common use not 
amenable to re-sacralisation must be clarified by a reengagement with a notion of ‘the 
contemporary’, similar to the one Deleuze located in the critical diagnostics of Foucault’s 
archaeology. We need an archaeology of the discourse of cultural heritage to provoke 
an experimentum monumenti–an experience of the conflicting presents of the past, the 
heterochronicity of monuments and the shared temporality of community as irreconcilable 
with the eternal presence of the past and the universal essence of the human. Only such 
an archaeological experience and its ensuing diagnosis of the contemporary will enable us 
to be ‘for our time’, act counter to our time, on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a 
time to come.
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Notes
[1] All non-english references are translated by the author. 
[2] In 2003, UNESCO included ‘intangible cultural heritage’ and thus included heritage 
beyond physical artefacts.
[3] With regards to an accelerated succession of ‘generations’ it would be interesting to 
question the current status of Jan Assmann’s distinction between ‘communicative memory’ 
as a non-institutional, disembodied memory reaching ‘no farther back than eighty years, 
the time span of three interacting generations’ (Assmann, 2010: 111) and ‘cultural memory’, 
institutionalised and guarded by specialists, reaching ‘back into the past only so far as the 
past can be reclaimed as “ours”’ (Assmann, 2010: 111). Such an analysis does not, however, 
fall within the scope of the present article. 
[4] Nietzsche’s formulation of the untimely as quoted above played a central role in 
Deleuzian philosophy from the earliest works to the late readings of Foucault, c.f. in 
Difference and Repetition: ‘[…] philosophy is neither a philosophy of history, nor a 
philosophy of the eternal, but untimely, always and only untimely - that is to say, “acting 
counter to our time and thereby, acting on our time and, let us hope, for the benefit of a 
time to come”’ (Deleuze, 1994: xxi). It should be noted, however, that ‘intempestif ’ only 
becomes synonymous with ‘actuel’ in the later works. In his 1962 book on Nietzsche, 
‘intempestif ’ is on the contrary synonymous with ‘inactuel’, cf. (Deleuze, 1962: 122), due 
to the French translation of Nietzsche’s Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen as Considérations 
inactuelles. 
[5] ‘[…] almost every major museum claimed and still claims that its Web site is André 
Malraux’s museum without walls’. (Chun, 2006: 23) and ‘[…] digitization has been trumpeted 
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as a way for libraries finally to fulfil their mission: to accumulate and provide access to 
human knowledge. Digital archives are allegedly H. G. Wells’s “World Brain” and André 
Malraux’ s museum without walls, among other dreams, come true’ (Chun, 2011: 137). ‘In 
other words, similarly as the photographic and new image cultures in the early part of the 
twentieth century forced not only a rethinking of perception but also of collection, memory, 
and organisation as was evident for example in Aby Warburg’s work […], now software 
cultures demand a rethinking of similar extent’ (Parikka, 2012: 90). See also Berry et al, 
(2013).
[6] Mitchell’s lecture is studied here in two versions, one in Berlin on April 10 2014 and 
one in Copenhagen on April 23 2014. The Copenhagen edition was experienced in person 
while the Berlin edition was watched on the website of the conference Image Operations: 
https://www.ici-berlin.org/event/571/. Quotes from the Copenhagen edition are taken from 
an unpublished handout of the lecture’s manuscript. 
[7] Mitchell quoting (Didi-Huberman, 2004: 13). The passage can also be found in French in 
(Didi-Huberman, 2013: 115). 
[8] Didi-Huberman is mainly critical of the Malraux of the Musée imaginaire and on. He sees 
in Malraux’s earlier writings from the 1930s a ‘bien pensé’ emancipatory challenging of the 
past, whereas the later Malraux turns into a ‘bien pensant’ mainly interested in preserving 
his own position as organising mastermind. A critical rereading of the earlier Malraux as a 
challenge of the ‘bien pensé’ description would be valuable but surpasses the scope of the 
present article. 
[9] Malraux was familiar with such wrenching from his youth when in December 1923, 
after an unfortunate investment in the Mexican mining industry, he sought to alleviate his 
financial ruin by stealing devata statues from the Cambodian ruins of Banteay Srei. 
[10] Cf. also (Malraux, 1974, 46). 
[11] Parts of the movie were censured until 1963, that is, including during Malraux’s tenure 
as minister for cultural affairs from 1959. Incidentally, Resnais married Malraux’s daughter, 
Florence, the year of his resignation from the ministry in 1969. 
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[12] For a recent criticism of UNESCO’s ‘World Heritage’ listing as the transformation of a 
city into a mausoleum cf. (D’Eramo, 2014). For Agamben’s description of the sacralising 
function of the museum and the ‘World Heritage’ listing as well as the need for profanation 
cf. (Agamben, 2007: 83–85). 
[13] Malraux is here taken as protagonist of the discourse of cultural heritage. And not 
without reason. Both before, during and after his tenure as minister for cultural affairs from 
1959 to 1969, Malraux had a profound influence on UNESCO, e.g. via numerous speeches 
from 1936 even until twenty years after his death where UNESCO played a recording of 
a 1960 speech of his in his honour. UNESCO states: ‘Mr Malraux, who praised the “act by 
which man snatches something from death,” formulated for the first time the concept of 
the universality of cultural heritage, which thereafter would stand at the heart of UNESCO’s 
actions in the field of culture’. http://www.unesco.org/bpi/eng/unescopress/96–210e.htm.
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